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I. INTRODUCTION
When observers examine how any individual court has fared at the
hands of the U.S. Supreme Court, they usually restrict their attention to
the cases that the justices have taken directly from that court. Thus we
hear that, in a recent Supreme Court term, such-and-such a court has
been reversed or vacated in ten of twelve cases or has been affirmed in
four of seven cases. Those writing about such statistics often appear to
forget that the Supreme Court regularly reverses or vacates more
frequently than it affirms, with a “baseline” reversal rate between sixty
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percent and two-thirds.3 Nonetheless, that a court has a high proportion
of its cases reversed in any term receives particular attention, especially
when the justices have decided more than a few cases from that court.
This has focused attention on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the largest federal appellate court, because of instances in
which virtually all the cases to which the Supreme Court has granted
review from that court were reversed. Receiving particular recent
attention was the 1996 Term, where 27 of 28 Ninth Circuit cases were
reversed or vacated,4 and the 1983 Term, in which the reversal rate for
the Ninth Circuit was similar.
Although the statistics based on cases taken directly from Court X
are important, taken alone they provide an incomplete picture. That is
because the Supreme Court also rules on the decisions of that court
indirectly, that is, in cases taken from other courts. Although the picture
from the latter rulings might not change the justices’ level of support for
the decisions of Court X, the Supreme Court may support that court
more, or less, frequently in indirect rulings than in the rulings in cases
taken directly from it. Were the proportion of support or disagreement
quite different from that in the Supreme Court’s direct review of Court
X’s cases, ignoring this information by relying only on direct
affirmances and reversals would definitely leave a distorted view. In
short, adding this dimension provides a more complete, or less
incomplete, picture of the extent to which the Ninth Circuit is in tune
with the Supreme Court. One must also consider whether the Supreme
Court has mentioned the lower court’s opinion and the justices’ tone in
doing so.5
In one sense, any decision of the Supreme Court speaks to the
rulings of Court X even if the latter are nowhere mentioned in the
Supreme Court’s opinion. If Court X has ruled on a subject and a
Supreme Court decision on that subject sustains, modifies, undercuts, or
directly contradicts that ruling, lawyers will be quick to call it to the
attention of Court X’s judges in the next relevant case. If Court X has
spoken in a particular way about an issue and the Supreme Court
3

See, e.g., STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 219 (4th ed. 1993).
4
See Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998).
5
Examination of justices’ remarks, positive or negative, about Ninth Circuit cases in
all cases the justices reviewed from other circuits, whether or not involving an intercircuit
conflict, is beyond the scope of this study. For such examination of Supreme Court
opinions in cases from a federal district court after the Ninth Circuit had reviewed them,
see Stephen L. Wasby, The District of Oregon in the U.S. Supreme Court, 39
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 851 (2003).
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overturns another court’s identical statement, the Supreme Court has
effectively overturned the former court as well as the one from which it
had taken the case it reviewed; likewise, in upholding the statement of
another court which is similar to Court X’s ruling, it has effectively
affirmed Court X’s position.
Yet there are cases in which the rulings of Court X are explicitly
before the Supreme Court in cases taken from other courts. This is
particularly so in the principal category of cases to which the Supreme
Court grants review, those in which there is an intercircuit conflict on the
point of law at issue.6 If the justices accept a case from the Third Circuit
to rule on an issue on which the Ninth Circuit has taken a contrary
stance, the Supreme Court’s action affirming or reversing the Third
Circuit directly implicates the Ninth Circuit’s position. In this
hypothetical, when the Third Circuit’s position is affirmed, the result is a
de facto reversal of the Ninth Circuit; where the Third Circuit is
reversed, the outcome is an implicit affirmance of the Ninth Circuit’s
position. In the 1996 Term, for example, in Boggs v. Boggs, the Supreme
Court, while overturning a Fifth Circuit ruling denying ERISA
preemption, noted that a Ninth Circuit ruling was “in substantial
conflict” with the Fifth Circuit,7 and, in so doing, implicitly upheld the
Ninth Circuit.
A. The Present Study
Does the picture provided by the Supreme Court’s treatment of a
court’s rulings in cases taken from other courts differ from the picture
given by the results from decisions taken directly in that court? To
illustrate how the picture provided by intercircuit conflict cases indeed
may differ from the usually-presented “raw score,” the justices’ rulings
on intercircuit conflicts in which cases from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit are part of the conflict are examined and
compared with the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases taken directly
6

The Court’s Rules state an intercircuit conflict as a matter to be considered in
granting certiorari. See Supreme Court Rule 10, in which “the character of the reasons the
Court considers” are noted when: “(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a
decision in conflict with the decision on another United States court of appeals on the
same important matter[.]” SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (effective May 1, 2003). Among the
important studies discussing intercircuit conflicts as a basis for the grant of certiorari are
H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1991) and DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1980), as well as the work of Arthur D. Hellman, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Light
on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience,
1998 SUP. CT. REV. 247.
7
520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997).
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from that court.8 The present study, while focusing on one decade,
encompasses more than two decades. Receiving detailed examination are
cases the Supreme Court decided in October Terms (“O.T.”) 1980-1989
and 1990-1999, the latter receiving greater attention, with a brief
addendum carrying matters forward through the 2003 Term.
The article begins with the most recent complete decade of the
Supreme Court’s terms – O.T. 1990 - 1999. After findings from the
decade are presented, the types of cases in each of five terms (O.T. 19951999) are discussed. Findings from the previous decade, O.T. 1980 1989, are then provided. In the most recent decade, the Supreme Court
had almost total control of its docket through its certiorari jurisdiction,9
which produces almost all the cases entailing intercircuit conflicts. This
makes the period commencing in the late 1980s the most fertile one for
exploring the Court’s treatment of intercircuit conflict cases. Virtually all
of the Court’s remaining appeal jurisdiction—except for voting rights
cases, particularly on reapportionment—had been removed in the mid1980s, and the full effect of the severe reduction in appeal cases had
taken effect in the Supreme Court by O.T. 1990, although appeal cases
still showed up as late as O.T. 198910 because the change was applicable
only to cases filed after passage of the statute. 11
When appeal cases were a significant portion of the Court’s docket,
a smaller proportion of the Court’s rulings were in intercircuit conflicts.
8

The latter – cases taken directly from the Ninth Circuit – are not separated into
those which entail an intercircuit conflict and those which do not; whether the Ninth
Circuit fares differently in those two categories is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, the rate at which the justices reverse the Ninth Circuit suggests that the court of
appeals does less well in intercircuit conflict cases taken directly from the Ninth Circuit
than in the intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits in which a Ninth Circuit
case is part of the conflict.
In October Term 1996, for which we do have data, ten of the 28 cases from the
Ninth Circuit that the Supreme Court decided involved intercircuit conflicts. In two, other
circuits had also adopted the rejected Ninth Circuit position, which had been the majority
one, while in five cases, the Ninth Circuit was the lone court in conflict with multiple
courts which adopted the position the Supreme Court upheld. See Herald, supra note 4,
and Stephen L. Wasby, The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court: Relations Between
Higher and Lower Courts (1998) (paper presented at annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association; on file with author).
9
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000). See RICHARD H. FALLON, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 468 (5th ed. 2003) (“In 1988, Congress
completed the gradual transition from mandatory to discretionary review of state court
decisions by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to eliminate appeals as of right and to make all
state court judgments reviewable only by writ of certiorari.”).
10
See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 41 n.15
(1989) (Court states that although “in the near future our appellate jurisdiction will
extend only to rare cases” the Court will “assume that the appeal is proper.”).
11
28 U.S.C. § 1257; see supra note 9.
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A significant number of cases in the appeal jurisdiction came from the
state courts, whose rulings might conflict with those of other state courts
but not with rulings of the federal courts of appeals.12 Moreover, rather
than waiting for an intercircuit conflict to develop, as it could do with
cases in its certiorari jurisdiction, the Court had to take appeal cases, and
in those cases, the justices did not indicate disagreement among the
lower courts in interpretation of the issue before them.13 Although there
may have been a smaller proportion of Supreme Court cases involving
intercircuit conflicts in the 1980s than in the 1990s, the number of such
cases was large because the Court accepted and decided so many more
cases than in the 1990s, when its plenary decision output was less than
ninety cases per term.14
One other aspect of intercircuit conflict cases requires comment. In
any particular term, Supreme Court cases taken directly from any court
of appeals were decided in that court within a relatively short period of
time, approximately a year.15 That may also be true for some of the other
lower court rulings involved in the conflicts, in which petitions for
certiorari may have been filed. Thus, two of the four cases the justices
mentioned in Martin v. Hadix as representing the position opposite to
that of the case under review were noted as “cert. pending”16 and all the
cases cited were very recent or only one and two years old, perhaps a
result of the newness of the statute at issue. Often, however, when an
intercircuit conflict prompts the justices to review a case, some of the
cases constituting the conflict may have been decided some time earlier –
indeed, several years before– because a conflict does not necessarily
develop instantly or within a few months but may have been long in the

12
While federal court-state court conflicts are among the factors the justices
consider in deciding whether or not to grant review, such conflicts are not included in the
data for this study.
13
In those appeals cases disposed of by summary affirmances, there could be no
notation of inter-court conflict as there was no opinion.
14
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 403, 406; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist
Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 578 (2003) (“During all the
years of the Burger Court and up through the first year of the Rehnquist Court, the Court
decided about 150 cases per year. During the years of the second Rehnquist Court, the
Court has decided only about half that many cases.”)
15
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (the Court decided a circuit split
within one year after the Fourth Circuit ruled that qualified immunity was proper because
the right allegedly violated was not “clearly established”).
16
527 U.S. 343, 352 (1999). Generally the justices hold “cert. pending” cases until
they decide the case they did agree to review, and they then either deny review or grant,
vacate, and remand (GVR) in light of the newly decided case.
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making.17 Either the conflict may have existed for some time before the
justices concluded that a recent case adding to one side of the conflict
warranted a grant of certiorari, or all the circuits which had decided the
issue over several years had agreed, with another circuit having created
the conflict only recently,18 thus prompting the justices’ decision to deal
with it.
B. A Note on Data
The data utilized in this somewhat rudimentary study are in certain
ways rough and approximate. However, without being able to say a
priori that the Ninth Circuit’s record would look better or worse after
adding these cases to those the justices took directly from that court, if
the new data reveal a distinct difference from the picture shown by the
regularly-used “raw score” count, we should be put on notice that by
continuing to rely solely on that measure, we are providing far from a
complete or accurate picture. In this article, the cases cited by the
Supreme Court as being in conflict are used to see whether the position
taken in the Ninth Circuit case cited conforms to what the Supreme Court
then decides or is contrary to the position the justices adopt. The cases
used in this study are those which the Court cites as creating or being
part of an intercircuit conflict, either in the text when it gives such a
conflict as the reason for granting certiorari, in the footnote attached to
that text, or at some later point in the opinion.19 Cases not directly cited
but otherwise clearly identifiable, as when they are referred to as
collected in a cited lower court ruling, are also used, although it requires
going beyond the Supreme Court opinion for data.
Because the Supreme Court at times only cites examples of cases
on either side of the conflict without appearing to provide a complete
listing of all circuits that have taken positions on the issue (“E.g., Jones
17
See, for example, Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000), in which the Supreme
Court resolved a conflict that included a 1990 Ninth Circuit ruling, Reddy v. Litton
Indus., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1990), to which the justices had denied certiorari in 1991.
18
See, for example, Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530
U.S. 238, 244 (2000), in which the Court stated that in 1999, the Seventh Circuit had
“departed from the uniform position of the Courts of Appeals.” The Ninth Circuit case
was Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1995).
19
In addition to noting intercircuit conflicts that lead the justices to grant review, the
Supreme Court at times has also noted intracircuit conflict. See, for example, United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 830 n.1 (1987), there, in a footnote to an
immigration case from the Eighth Circuit, Justice Marshall stated, “Respondents have at
no point raised, and we do not express any opinion regarding, the propriety of the group
deportation procedure used in this case. Compare United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575
F.2d 219, 219-220 (9th Cir. 1978), with United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F.2d 976,
977 (9th Cir. 1980).”
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v. Smith, holding X, and Green v. Hill, holding Y.”), this method will
result in an undercount of cases from any particular court. When the
Supreme Court refers to “many other lower courts,” without providing a
citation,20 that the present method provides an undercount is clear.21 In
this initial exploration, we limit ourselves to cases explicitly cited, on the
theory that those generally are the ones the Supreme Court considered
sufficiently significant to mention.
Also noted but not receiving extended treatment here are instances
in these intercircuit conflict cases when the Supreme Court has referred,
either positively or negatively, to Ninth Circuit law not involved in an
intercircuit conflict. For example, in a 1997 case from the Eighth Circuit,
the justices, noting that “the Courts of Appeals have adopted different
standards . . . for deciding whether a federal instrumentality may sue in
federal court to enjoin state taxation where the United States is not a coplaintiff,” upheld the Ninth Circuit’s position, based on an earlier First
Circuit case, as well as the First Circuit’s later, modified position.22 On
the other side, in ruling on a Seventh Circuit case on standing, when
Justice Scalia criticized several courts of appeals for their practice of
proceeding by assuming jurisdiction to decide the merits (the “doctrine
of hypothetical jurisdiction”), three of seven cases he cited were from the
Ninth Circuit.23 While dissenting Justice Stevens called this part of
Justice Scalia’s opinion “pure dictum” and as “com[ing] to the same
thing as an advisory opinion,” 24 there is no question that the Court had
disapproved of the Ninth Circuit practice.
In recording data, a “plus” sign is given to lower court rulings in
which the lower court’s position and the Supreme Court’s holding are in
agreement, and a “minus” sign to those in which the courts have taken
contrary stances. When in a single case, the justices decide more than
one issue implicating an intercircuit conflict, and the Court supports a
20
See, for example, Coil Indus. Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan, 489 U.S.
561, 568 (1989), where the Court observed, “We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
in the lower courts over” the issue. See also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 363 (2000); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 (1983).
21
For present purposes, the same is true when the sources cited are difficult to
access, as in a reference to cases cited in an addendum to a brief.
22
Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 830 (1997). A further
example is Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), in which the Supreme Court took the
same position on a particular issue as had all courts of appeals, including the Ninth
Circuit. As Justice Kennedy put it, “[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals and with all
other courts of appeals which have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Baja v. Ducharme, 187
F.3d 1075, 1078-1079 (9th Cir 1999)” and then citing cases from five other circuits. Id. at
432.
23
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (citing cases).
24
Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lower court on one issue while disagreeing with it on the other, the case
is scored as mixed (+/-) or a “split” result, counted as .5 support rather
than 1.0 support. Each case is given the same weight, although some may
object that “landmark” cases, or what are taken to be such cases, such as
the “assisted suicide” case25 or the “spotted owl” environmental case,26
are more important than those on “small” points of civil procedure. In
short, some may wish to argue that some cases are more equal than
others, but for present purposes each case counts the same as each other
case.
There are instances when the division between or among circuits on
a legal question is fairly straightforward, with circuits lining up cleanly
on either side, and with lower courts’ positions at direct odds with that
the Supreme Court adopts. However, scoring the lower court’s ruling in
relation to the Supreme Court’s resolution is not always easy. This is true
when the courts of appeals have adopted a range of positions27 and the
justices’ holding is at a point on the continuum quite near, but not exactly
identical to, that of the lower court on which the observer is focusing. In
this study, the basic rule is that if the Supreme Court does not adopt the
Ninth Circuit’s position, the case is scored “minus” even if the lower
court’s position is midway between the adopted and rejected positions.
That is, “not Supreme Court” is “no.” This is so because of two reasons:
one is that because the Supreme Court’s position is the rule the lower
courts must now apply, regardless of how “close” their previous position
was to the one the justices adopted. The other is that it is difficult to
construct an appropriate metric for determining how near or close the
lower court position was to the Supreme Court’s holding. However, in
some instances a “(+)” or “(-)” has been assigned when the Supreme
Court neither directly supports nor opposes the lower court position but
takes a position quite close to the latter’s view. Thus, a “(+)” would be
assigned if the justices reach the same basic result as the lower court but
adopt somewhat different reasoning in doing so.28 From the perspective
of the lower court, this scoring system is conservative because it makes it

25

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), rev’g Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
26
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
27
See, for example, Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,
56 (1987), where the Court referred to the “three-way conflict in the Circuits” in a case
not involving the Ninth Circuit.
28
See, for example, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 185-186 (1977),
where the Court indicated three positions. While the justices explicitly rejected the Third
Circuit’s position, they did not rule on whether the Eighth Circuit’s or Ninth Circuit’s
position was correct.
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less likely that the court of appeals will receive credit for having adopted
a position the Supreme Court approves.
Reliance is placed on what the Supreme Court says about lower
court cases, that is, its characterization of those rulings –usually the
statement of the holding that appears in parentheses following the case
citation– if that allows a clear inference as to the side of a conflict on
which a lower court ruling falls. At times, while not engaging in
extensive discussion, the Court reports the lower court rulings in a
sentence or more, but most often only citations are provided and little
more is said. When the Supreme Court opinion indicates only that cases
are on opposite sides of an issue but does not indicate their holdings (e.g,
“Compare Jones v. Smith with Green v. Hill.”), the court of appeals’
opinions have been examined to make a determination; this is also
necessary when the direction of the Supreme Court’s citation is unclear.29
This method is certainly not as precise as would be the case if one
engaged in the far more labor-intensive task of comparing every
Supreme Court ruling on an intercircuit conflict with the text of cited
lower court rulings or, even more onerous, the corpus of a lower court’s
doctrine. Yet it should provide a basic picture that may prompt other
observers of the relation between the Supreme Court and lower courts to
look further. That should certainly be the case if there is divergence
between how a court fares in intercircuit conflict cases from other
circuits and how it fares when the justices directly review its cases. On
the other hand, if the two sets of data converge, then the “raw score” data
for cases taken directly from a court might continue to be seen as broadly
indicative of how the court was treated by its judicial superiors.
II. FINDINGS: 1990 - 1999 TERMS
We now turn to examine the Ninth Circuit’s record in the Supreme
Court’s 1990-1999 Terms based on the intercircuit conflict cases from
other circuits in which the Ninth Circuit was part of the conflict. The
principal finding is that in all ten terms, the Ninth Circuit fared better in
the Supreme Court’s rulings on intercircuit conflicts in cases taken from
other courts of appeals than in Ninth Circuit cases reviewed directly.30 In
all ten terms, the Supreme Court had reversed or vacated well more half
the latter, whereas in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits,
29

See, e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 n.1 (1982).
There, after the listing of courts whose decisions conflicted with the Third Circuit (from
which the case came), there is a “Cf.” cite with several cases listed. The meaning of
“Cf.”citation to a Ninth Circuit case is not clear.
30
Not included are cases in which certiorari is granted and the case is vacated and
remanded (GVR), usually for consideration in light of an earlier Supreme Court ruling.
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the justices supported the Ninth Circuit position in at least half such
cases in four terms and, even when ruling against the Ninth Circuit in
less than fifty percent of a term’s cases, upheld the lower court’s position
at a higher rate than in the Ninth Circuit’s cases that were directly
reviewed, and often by substantial percentage differences. Over the tenyear period, in these cases Ninth Circuit law was sustained at a 49
percent rate, as compared to roughly 20 percent in cases taken directly
from the Ninth Circuit, a difference of 29 percent. Adding the
“intercircuit conflict” and “direct” cases, the Ninth Circuit position was
sustained just under one-third of the time (31.9%), not a shabby showing
considering that the Supreme Court takes cases primarily to reverse
them.
How the Ninth Circuit fared in the cases the Supreme Court took
directly from it provides a baseline. The rate at which the justices
affirmed the Ninth Circuit in cases reviewed directly from that court,
although averaging roughly twenty percent, ranged from a low of 3.6
percent in the infamous 1996 Term and a 10 percent affirmance rate in
O.T. 1999, to a high of just under one-third – 31.3% and 32.6% in O.T.
1991 and O.T. 1992, respectively; no particular trend was evident over
the decade. For the remainder of the terms, the affirmance rate stood at
about 20 percent – slightly over in O.T. 1993 (21.4%) and 1998 (23.7%),
right at that proportion (20.6%) in O.T. 1997, and below in O.T. 1990
(15.4%) and 1995 (17.9%).
Likewise, the justices’ support of the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit
conflict cases taken from other circuits had a considerable range – 61.9
percentage points – from a low of 23.1 percent (O.T. 1995) to a high of
85 percent (O.T. 1996). Again, no particular trend is evident as the
proportion of support varies over time while averaging almost one-half
(48.8%). Of particular note, in addition to O.T. 1996, is O.T. 1999, when
the Ninth Circuit position was supported in two-thirds of the intercircuit
conflict cases in which its rulings were involved, and the two terms in
which the Ninth Circuit position was supported in half the cases – O.T.
1990 (53.8%) and O.T. 1998 (50%). In five other terms, support for the
Ninth Circuit was from one-third (O.T. 1994) to somewhat less than half
(45.8%, O.T. 1991), so that it fell below one-third in only one term, O.T.
1995 (23.1%).
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How much better did the Ninth Circuit do in intercircuit conflict
cases from other circuits than in cases the justices took directly from that
court? If the proportion of affirmance in Ninth Circuit “direct review”
cases is subtracted from the proportion of support for the Ninth Circuit
position in intercircuit conflict cases from other circuits, the difference
averaged almost 30 percent (29.2%) but with a very wide range – a full
76.2 percentage points. The difference was less than 10 percent in only
one term, O.T. 1995, the term in which the justices’ support for the Ninth
Circuit in intercircuit conflict cases was lowest. However, even then it
remained higher than its support for that court in direct review cases,
shrinking the margin to 5.2 percent so that, while the two separate
measures of support come close to converging in that term, they do not
do so. Thus, at least in the 1990’s, support for the Ninth Circuit is never
greater in cases taken directly from that court.
Put differently, support for the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit conflict
cases from other courts was greater than support for the Ninth Circuit in
cases directly from that court by more than 10 percent in all but one term
during the decade. In two terms, the difference was from 10 to 15 percent
(O.T. 1992: 10.7%; O.T. 1991: 14.4%); it was in the 20 percent range in
three other terms (O.T. 1993: 22.l%; O.T. 1997: 22.3%; O.T. 1998:
26.3%); and in one other, it exceeded one-third (O.T. 1990: 38.4%). The
difference actually exceeded 50 percent in two relatively recent terms –
O.T. 1999, when it was 56.7%, and O.T. 1996, when it was a
monumental 81.4%. That last figure may seem astounding, but it results
from a juxtaposition of the Court’s lowest recent one-term support for
the Ninth Circuit in cases directly reviewed with its highest support for
the Ninth Circuit in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other courts of
appeals.
The figures for O.T. 1996 and O.T. 1999 are particularly important,
because these are the two terms during the 1990s in which the Supreme
Court most frequently reversed the Ninth Circuit in cases taken directly
from that circuit. Yet in intercircuit conflict cases drawn from other
circuits, these are the two terms in which the Ninth Circuit not only did
better than it had done in “direct” cases but in fact did exceptionally well,
as its position was validated upwards of two-thirds of the time. The
juxtaposition of the high approval rate for Ninth Circuit rulings in
intercircuit cases from other circuits with high reversal of rulings in cases
taken directly from the Ninth Circuit could not be more stark.
This is not to suggest that there is a correlation, much less a causal
relationship, between the two phenomena. However, that approval rates
in intercircuit conflict cases and reversal rates in direct cases do not
move in parallel reinforces the need to examine both figures for any
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given Supreme Court term in order to get a more extensive, and thus
more accurate, picture of how a court of appeals fares at the Supreme
Court’s hands. That juxtaposition severely underscores that the picture
one obtains by restricting oneself to direct review cases provides an
incomplete, nay, a distorted view. Where observers talked about the
beating the Ninth Circuit received in O.T. 1996, they should have been
talking as well about the high rate of support Ninth Circuit positions
received in cases implicating intercircuit conflicts.
That finding leads to an examination of the picture that would be
obtained by combining the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases the
justices took directly from the Ninth Circuit and cases in which the Court
took a stance on Ninth Circuit rulings when it decided intercircuit
conflict cases from other courts of appeals. This combination shows that
the Ninth Circuit’s position is upheld slightly under one-third of the time
(31.9%). However, a particularly noticeable effect is that the range of
support becomes compressed – to only 26 percentage points – as the
already-noted high and low percentages are cancelled out. The lowest
Supreme Court support for Ninth Circuit positions is now one-fifth
(20.4%) in the 1995 Term, a result of the combination of the lowest level
of support in intercircuit cases and a relatively high reversal rate in cases
taken directly from the Ninth Circuit, while the highest combined
support is less than one-half – 46.4 percent in the 1999 Term, where the
two-thirds support in intercircuit conflict cases overcomes a very low
affirmance rate (10 percent) in direct cases because the number of the
latter is small (only 10 percent). Overall, the combined level of support is
between 20 and 30 percent in four (consecutive) terms (O.T. 1993 1996), around the mid-30s in the three prior consecutive terms (O.T.
1990 - 1992) and O.T. 1997, and two-fifths or more in the decade’s last
two terms (40 percent in O.T. 1998, in addition to the already-noted 46.4
percent in O.T. 1999).
III. A LOOK AT SOME INDIVIDUAL TERMS
With the levels of support the Supreme Court has given the Ninth
Circuit in the two types of cases and the resulting differences in support
levels between the two types of cases now having been have been
presented, a closer examination of the individual terms is in order. For
these purposes, five terms – O.T. 1995-1999 – are discussed, with the
most recent of those five terms presented first.
A. O.T. 1999
In its 1999 Term, while the Supreme Court affirmed only one of ten
Ninth Circuit cases it took directly from that court, it supported the Ninth
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Circuit’s position in two-thirds of the intercircuit conflict cases taken
from other circuits in which a Ninth Circuit case was part of the conflict.
Most of the rulings were on matters of federal law and came in what
were not landmark decisions.
Among the issues in which the Ninth Circuit’s position was
supported were when tax remittances were “paid”;31 who was authorized
to sue under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”);32 whether the Fair Labor Standards Act permitted an
employer to force use of compensatory time;33 what evidence is
necessary to support a verdict under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”);34 and two civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) matters—a statute of limitations
issue and the necessary content of a conspiracy claim.35 In addition, in a
case concerning preemption under the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had
ruled in favor of preemption, but the Supreme Court’s basis for that
preemption differed from the lower court’s.36
Several questions related to federal criminal statutes: whether arson
of a private residence not used for commercial purposes fell within the
federal arson statute, implicating the scope of the Commerce Clause;37
whether penalizing use of a “machinegun” was a separate offense or a
sentencing factor;38 and what elements of an offense were necessary to
obtain a lesser included offense jury instruction.39 There were also
rulings on two issues of constitutional importance: the propriety and
necessary elements of a public university activity fee for extracurricular
student speech,40 and whether state and local educational agencies were
permitted to loan educational materials and equipment to private
schools,41 in which two early important church-state rulings42 were
overruled.
The smaller number of decisions in which the justices adopted the
views of circuits whose positions were contrary to that of the Ninth
Circuit included the issues of whether an heir’s interest in an estate was
31

Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431 (2000).
Harris Trust & Savs. v. Solomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238 (2000)
33
Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576 (2000)
34
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Co., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
35
Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 (2000); Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
36
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
37
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
38
Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
39
Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000).
40
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
41
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
42
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
32
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“property” under the federal lien statute;43 whether Federal Arbitration
Act venue provisions were permissive;44 and what was the burden of
proof for an officer’s liability for a corporation’s failure to pay taxes.45 In
the criminal sphere, the issues were whether one could represent oneself
in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction46 and when supervised
release commenced in relation to date of release from prison.47 The most
important issue, which was also related to the Court’s growing federal
jurisprudence, was whether the ADEA abrogated states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.48
In addition to these rulings in intercircuit conflict matters, the
Supreme Court also spoke to Ninth Circuit rulings in two other cases
involving rulings by several courts of appeals. In one, the Ninth Circuit
was not involved in the intercircuit conflict that led the Supreme Court to
take the case, but in one part of the opinion, the position of the Ninth
Circuit and several other courts of appeals on a point relied on by
petitioner was said to be “of questionable consistency” with the relevant
Federal Rule.49 In the other case, there was no intercircuit conflict: all the
courts of appeals were on the same side of an issue, and the Supreme
Court approved their position.50
B. O.T. 1998
In the eleven intercircuit conflict cases in which a Ninth Circuit
case was part of the conflict in O.T. 1998, the Ninth Circuit’s position
prevailed in five and was overturned in five. The remaining case, which
involved application of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)
attorneys’ fee provisions to cases pending when the statute became
effective, was a “split decision” for the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled
that the new law capped all fees paid post-statute even for prior work,51
while the justices upheld such a cap only for post-Act work.52
The cases in which the Ninth Circuit’s position was upheld
included the antitrust issue of whether certain group boycotts were per se
violations;53 the availability of a cause of action under the civil rights
43

Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
Cortez Byrd Chips v. Harbert, 529 U.S. 193 (2000).
45
Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000).
46
Martinez v. C.A. of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
47
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000).
48
Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
49
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 453 (2000).
50
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
51
Madrid v. Gomez, 150 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1998).
52
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (2000).
53
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
44
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conspiracy statute for conspiracy to terminate an “at-will” employee;54
and, in criminal procedure, whether a guilty plea or statements at a plea
colloquy waived the right to silence at sentencing.55 Also on this side of
the ledger were two cases of somewhat broader significance – one on
when a school board was liable under Title IX for student-on-student
sexual harassment56 and the Greater New Orleans Broadcasting case,57
on the important First Amendment issue of whether a ban on
broadcasting lottery information could be applied to advertisements of
legal gambling from stations located where the gambling was legal.
The other side of the balance sheet included cases on appellate
procedure, on the appealability of a sanctions order;58 bankruptcy, on the
rights of pre-bankruptcy stockholders in relation to senior creditors’
rights;59 employment law, on the relation between Social Security
Disability Insurance claims and suits for improper discharge under the
Americans with Disabilities Act;60 and criminal procedure, on the intent
required under the federal carjacking statute61 and whether a warrant was
required to seize a car thought to be forfeitable.62
C. O.T. 1997
The 1997 Term was one in which the justices ruled against the
Ninth Circuit is a majority of both cases taken directly from that court
and those implicated in their rulings on intercircuit conflicts, although
the lower court fared slightly better in the latter. The Ninth Circuit’s
position was upheld in a bankruptcy case on certain pre-bankruptcy
transfers63 and in cases involving the amount of evidence necessary to
withstand summary judgment in damages action against government
official;64 the prerequisites to federal suit over agency shop fees;65 when
state trial courts must instruct on lesser included offense in capital
cases;66 whether, in a suit to challenge parole revocation procedures,
collateral consequences of a probation revocation would be presumed or

54

Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998).
Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
56
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
57
Greater New Orleans Broad. Co. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
58
Cunningham v. Hamilton Co., 527 U.S. 198 (1999).
59
Bank of Am. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
60
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
61
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999).
62
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
63
Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
64
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
65
Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866 (1998).
66
Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 (1998).
55
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had to be shown;67 and the effect on removal to federal court of the
presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment.68
The slightly more numerous cases in which the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of those courts of appeals holding a position counter to that
of the Ninth Circuit were the amounts obtained through “actual fraud”
not subject to discharge in bankruptcy;69 the federal government’s
priority to be paid from an estate;70 the NLRB’s standard concerning
employer doubts about union majority support;71 and the basis for
removal of state law claims to federal court under federal question
jurisdiction.72
Substantially represented among these cases were questions of
criminal law and procedure. These were: the availability of an
“exculpatory no” (mere denial of wrongdoing) in false statements to
federal investigators;73 whether a sentence for an alien returning to the
U.S. after deportation on conviction of aggravated felony was a penalty
provision or a separate offense;74 the meaning of “carries a firearm”
during a crime,75 a case in which the Court also spoke approvingly of a
related position taken by the Ninth Circuit and all other courts of appeals,
which was thus not a matter of intercircuit conflict; and the effect of state
restoration of civil rights on an enhanced sentence for a felon carrying a
firearm,76 in which the Ninth Circuit’s position, which Justice Kennedy
categorized as an “intermediate” reading of the statute, had been reached
in an en banc ruling.
D. O.T. 1996
The 1996 Term is the one that people call to mind when they think
of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Ninth Circuit. Of the twentyeight cases the Supreme Court agreed to review from the Ninth Circuit –
a number representing a disproportionate amount of the Supreme Court’s
caseload – only one was affirmed. Yet far less visible was the fact that, in
another ten cases in which the justices spoke of Ninth Circuit rulings that
were part of the intercircuit conflict before the Supreme Court, the Court
upheld the Ninth Circuit’s position in eight cases, held against the Ninth
67

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998).
Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
69
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
70
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998).
71
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
72
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
73
Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
74
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
75
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
76
Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998).
68
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Circuit position in only one – on the effect of a judge’s error in not
submitting the materiality of a false statement to the jury.77
In the remaining case, an appeal from a Benefits Review Board
award which required treatment of two issues of statutory interpretation
under the Longshoremans and Harbor Workers Compensation Act
(“LHWCA”), the justices ruled against the Ninth Circuit position on one
point, holding that, before a worker’s death, the worker’s spouse was not
a “person entitled to compensation” for death benefits and thus did not
forfeit the right to collect such benefits when she did not obtain the
employer’s approval of settlements with third parties before her spouse’s
death. However, they ruled for the Ninth Circuit view on the other issue,
holding that because the Department of Labor is an “agency” to be
named as respondent on review of a Benefits Review Board’s decision in
a LHWCA case, the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs could be named as respondent in the court of appeals.78
Intercircuit conflicts on both points had given rise to the grant of
certiorari. On the latter issue, the position of the Fourth Circuit, where
the case originated, had conflicted with views of the D.C. and Ninth
Circuit, which the Supreme Court adopted, but on the former issue,
where the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were “in disagreement,” the justices
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s position.79
The range of topics in the cases in which the Ninth Circuit’s
position was upheld was quite broad. Included were ERISA preemption
of state community property laws;80 whether punitive damages in a
personal injury tort suit were taxable gross income;81 in bankruptcy law,
the value of collateral retained for use in business;82 securities law; in
employment discrimination, whether former employees were
“employees” for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision;83 and
two criminal matters – criminal liability for insider trading84 and whether

77

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 519 U.S.
248 (1997). There were two other cases, neither involving a conflict, in which the Court
supported the Ninth Circuit in one and ruled against its position in the other. United
States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997).
79
Petitioner Ingalls Shipbuilding had drawn on the Ninth Circuit position. In dealing
with Ingalls’ claim, Justice O’Connor made additional comments about Ninth Circuit
law, as she quoted from an earlier Ninth Circuit case and cited another in talking about an
issue the Court did not reach in this case.
80
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
81
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).
82
Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
83
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
84
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
78
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certain sentences could be concurrent.85 Also included was one of the
first cases interpreting the habeas corpus provisions of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), dealing with that law’s
application to pending cases.86
The last case, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp.,87 concerned civil RICO
statute-of-limitations rules, and it can be said to be only a temporary
upholding of the court of appeals’ position. On the major aspect of the
case, while explicitly rejecting the interpretation of one court of appeals,
the justices, “recogniz[ing] that our holding . . . does not resolve other
conflicts among the Circuits” which they felt the case’s facts did not
require them to resolve, reserved judgment on the choice between the
conflicting rules other circuits had adopted, in effect leaving all
temporarily in place.88 In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia complained
that the majority had not reached the question presented and observed
that the Court had granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit case that was
part of the conflict and had given it plenary treatment but had then
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.89
E. O.T. 1995
Interestingly, the previous term presented quite a different picture.
The Ninth Circuit did far less well in October Term 1995 cases from
other circuits taken to resolve intercircuit conflict cases implicating its
decisions. Indeed, in this regard, it did least well of the ten years in the
decade under examination. The Ninth Circuit’s position was sustained
only with respect to two criminal procedure issues – cumulative
punishment for a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) conviction90 and
the standard of review concerning the basis for searches91 – and
preemption of state claims under the Medical Device Amendments.92 In
addition, the justices upheld a Tax Court ruling involved in a Ninth
Circuit case, but the latter court had decided the case on other grounds.93
85

United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997).
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
521 U.S. 179 (1997).
88
Id. at 191. On other elements in the case, not entailing an intercircuit conflict, the
justices cited the Ninth Circuit’s caselaw approvingly.
89
See Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1003
(1996), cert. dismissed, 519 U.S. 233 (1997).
90
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996).
91
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
92
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
93
C.I.R. v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235 (1996). In another case, the Ninth Circuit was
among the six courts of appeals on the side to which the government switched its
position, leading the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, vacate, and remand (GVR) the
decision before it. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996).
86
87
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The range of cases in which the justices undermined the Ninth
Circuit’s position was considerable, extending from jurisdiction and civil
procedure through economic regulation, including labor relations, to
criminal law issues. The economic regulation issues included an
employer’s ERISA fiduciary duties94 and the labor relations questions of
treatment of “deadhead” transportation time under the Hours of Service
Act95 and National Labor Relations Act coverage of live-haul workers;96
there was also a question of the federal government’s sovereign
immunity from damage suits under the Rehabilitation Act.97 The criminal
law issues both involved sentencing – a departure from the Guidelines in
relation to a statutory minimum98 and the effect of aggregated sentences
on a defendant’s jury trial rights.99 There were two questions in the latter
case, but having decided that there was no jury trial right where
aggregated sentences exceeded six months, the justices said they did not
need to reach the question of whether such right was eliminated by a
judge’s pretrial ruling that the aggregate sentence would not exceed six
months.100
IV. THE DECADE OF THE 1980S
We have presented findings for the 1990s along with a closer look
at half the terms from that period. What can by learned by looking at the
prior decade? The period from O.T. 1980 through O.T. 1989 covers the
time when the Court’s appeal jurisdiction was severely curtailed such
that it all but ended. It was also a period of substantially greater output
on the merits per term, so that the number of intercircuit conflict cases
therefore remained high despite the jurisdictional alteration.
The picture from the decade of the 1980s is different from that of
the 1990s in a number of respects. The Ninth Circuit fared better in the
Supreme Court both in cases taken directly from the court of appeals and
in intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits, leading to the
greatest difference from the later decade—in the overall rate at which the
court’s position was upheld. As in the 1990s, overall the Ninth Circuit
did better in the intercircuit conflict cases than in the cases directly
reviewed, except for two terms in which the figures reverse—that is, the
94

Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 516
U.S. 152 (1996).
96
Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996).
97
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
98
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996).
99
Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996).
100
The Ninth Circuit had found a jury right but that the judge’s limiting the sentence
cured any error. Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
95
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rate in directly reviewed cases is better than that for intercircuit conflict
cases—and another term in which there was no difference, that is, the
same proportion of cases was upheld in each category. However, the
difference between the two figures for the decade as a whole is roughly
the same as that for the 1990s although slightly lower. Considerable
differences from year to year remain, but the range in intercircuit conflict
cases is more compressed while there is a greater range in the rate at
which directly reviewed cases were affirmed and in the “difference”
scores; the range for the combined (intercircuit and directly reviewed)
cases is roughly the same as it was to be in the 1990s.
As with our examination of the 1990s, we first look at the Supreme
Court’s treatment of the Ninth Circuit in cases taken directly from that
court. The justices upheld the Ninth Circuit in somewhat over one-third
(35.2%) of these cases throughout the decade, but the rate of affirmance
ranged from a low of 7.1 percent in the 1983 Term – the decade’s
equivalent of, and precursor to, the renowned 1996 Term – to a high of
57.1 percent. Indeed, in the last three terms of the decade, the Ninth
Circuit was affirmed at least half the time (55.8%, 57.1% and 50%), and
in two others (1981, 1986), the affirmance rate was over two-fifths – at
the mid-40-percent level. In only one term other than O.T. 1996 was the
affirmance rate as low as 25 percent.
In intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits, when a Ninth
Circuit case was part of the conflict, in only two of the ten terms was the
Ninth Circuit’s position upheld less than half the time; the figure fell
only to 44.4 percent in O.T. 1986 and 40.9 percent in the 1989 Term. In
four terms, the Ninth Circuit’s position was sustained in over 70 percent
of the relevant cases, and in two of those terms (1980 and 1984), the rate
was 75 percent. In O.T. 1983, like O.T. 1996 because of the very high
reversal rate for directly reviewed Ninth Circuit cases, the Ninth
Circuit’s position was sustained in three-fifths of the intercircuit conflict
cases in which its rulings were involved, a rate close to the decade-long
average of 60.1 percent.
Given that the rates at which the Ninth Circuit is upheld in the two
categories of cases do not move in parallel, what are the differences in
the rates? For the ten years, the difference averages to roughly twentyfive percentage points, somewhat less than for the 1990s, and the range is
62 percentage points, also a few points less than in the 1990s. The
“width” of the range in the 1980s is accounted for by the fact that it
extends from the 1983 Term, when the difference was over 50
percentage points (52.9%) because the 60 percent rate at which the Ninth
Circuit position prevailed in intercircuit conflict cases accompanied the
sharply lowest affirmance rate in directly reviewed cases, to -9.1 percent
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in the 1989 Term, when the Ninth Circuit was upheld more in directly
reviewed than in intercircuit conflict cases. As earlier noted, there was
another term (1988) in which the difference was negative, that is, when
directly reviewed cases were affirmed at higher rate than were cases in
intercircuit conflicts, and one term (1986) in which there was no
difference, as the justices upheld the Ninth Circuit an identical rate
(44.4%) in both categories of cases.
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Combining intercircuit conflict cases with directly reviewed ones
reveals that, as with the 1990s decade, the range of outcomes (the rate at
which the Ninth Circuit’s position is upheld) is compressed relative to
the ranges for either type of case separately. The smallest rate at which
the Ninth Circuit was upheld with the cases combined is 25.6 percent in
the 1983 Term. This was the year of the “spike” in reversals, which
served to offset the relatively high rate at which the court of appeals’
position was upheld in intercircuit conflict cases. At the other end of the
spectrum was the 1987 Term, when the Ninth Circuit’s position was
sustained over three-fifths of the time (62.9%); the rate dropped
somewhat but remained above half (55.0%) in the following term. There
are five terms in which the Ninth Circuit’s views were sustained half the
time or slightly below that (in the high 40’s). We find only one term in
addition to O.T. 1983 in which the combined rate is below 40 percent –
the 1984 Term, following the “year of the spike,” when the rate was 35
percent.
V. AND BRIEFLY FORWARD: INTO THE NEW CENTURY
To bring the picture from the twentieth century’s last two decades
up to date, a brief look at the first terms of the new century are in order,
to provide some assurance that the patterns already identified did not
change significantly. What, then, happened in the Supreme Court’s 2000
- 2003 Terms? In the 2000 Term, the number of intercircuit conflict
cases taken from other circuits but in which a Ninth Circuit case was part
of the conflict remained relatively high –between ten and twenty, as in
the previous two decades– but it is noteworthy that for the next three
terms (O.T. 2001-2003), the number of such cases was only four or five
per term.101
For all four terms, the Ninth Circuit fared quite well when the
Supreme Court used cases from other circuits to state the law in
intercircuit conflict situations in which a Ninth Circuit case was part of
the conflict. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit did exceedingly well, never having
its position upheld in less than fifty percent of such situations and being
upheld in all such cases in the 2002 Term.102 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit clearly did far better in such situations than in the cases taken
directly from it, for which the reversal rate remained very close to 75
101

In O.T. 2000, one of the intercircuit conflicts came in a case which the Supreme
Court took from a state court. C & L Enters. v. Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411
(2001). The same was true in O.T. 2003, when the Court decided Missouri v. Seibert, 124
S.Ct. 2601 (2004), from the Missouri Supreme Court.
102
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (the University of Michigan
Law School affirmative action case).
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percent for each term. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s “advantage” in
intercircuit conflict cases from other circuits over its situation when its
decisions were directly reviewed ranged from 26.5 percent (O.T. 2000)
to two terms in which it stood at just above 33 percent and one term
(O.T. 2002) in which it was an unusual 76 percent.
When directly reviewed Ninth Circuit cases are combined with the
intercircuit conflicts in which the Ninth Circuit was a part, the rate at
which the Ninth Circuit’s position was overturned, far from being a high
rate of the sort which has received opprobrium, is rather respectable.
Indeed, for all four terms, the figure extends from a low of only 32.1
percent in the most recently fully-completed term (O.T. 2003) to a high
of 38.6 percent (O.T. 2001), with the other terms right above one-third.
VI. WHAT MIGHT THIS MEAN?
Some intercircuit conflict cases do involve one-on-one conflicts,
with only one circuit on each side of the issue. An example is Boggs v.
Boggs, which is unusual in that Justice Kennedy not only noted the
conflict but stressed its importance because of the size of the circuits
involved.103 However, far from all intercircuit conflict cases involve such
one-on-one conflicts but instead they usually require the justices to favor
the position of several courts over one or more other courts. An example,
also from O.T. 1996, is the Sentencing Guidelines case of United States
v. LaBonte,104 where, in reversing the First Circuit, the justices ruled
against the Ninth Circuit position, which had adopted the First Circuit
view, while five other circuits had ruled in the direction the Supreme
Court adopted.
Multiple courts are usually on the side of the conflict the justices
uphold. Thus, in any single case, several circuits are likely to have “+”
scores, particularly when the justices have taken a case that creates a
conflict with several other circuits and, by reversing that ruling, uphold
all the others. Thus we might well expect that any court of appeals would
have a better record in intercircuit conflict cases than in cases taken
directly from that circuit. Yet even if we do expect any court of appeals
to do better in intercircuit cases than in their “direct” cases, which the
103
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 839 (1997) (“The division between the Circuits is
significant, for the Fifth Circuit has jurisdiction over the community property States of
Louisiana and Texas, while the Ninth Circuit includes the community property States of
Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, and Washington.”).
104
520 U.S. 751 (1997). One might note that, before the Sentencing Commission
had amended its commentary in the way the Supreme Court found contrary to the statute,
the Ninth Circuit had joined several other circuits in interpreting what was then the
Commission’s language as requiring application of the enhanced maximum term, the
position the Supreme Court ultimately adopted.
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Court is likely to take to reverse or vacate, the data from the intercircuit
conflict cases are crucial if we are to have a more complete picture of
how the law of a circuit fares in the Supreme Court.
In upholding – or rejecting – the Ninth Circuit’s position in cases
taken from other circuits, the Supreme Court is not likely saying
anything directly about the Ninth Circuit or its regard for that court. If
other courts had adopted the Ninth Circuit’s position or had taken a
stance consistent with it, then a defeat for the Ninth Circuit should not be
viewed as one for or against, or even aimed at, the Ninth Circuit alone.
However, in those few instances in which the Ninth Circuit is the only
court on one side of an intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court’s ruling
might be taken as directed at that court. With those cases perhaps kept
apart, overall the Ninth Circuit’s record reported here is not so much a
statement about how the justices view the Ninth Circuit itself as a
statement about the extent to which the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court read the law in the same way, where influence is more likely to run
from the Supreme Court to the Ninth Circuit than vice-versa.
When the Supreme Court rules on the law of a particular circuit in
the course of deciding a case from another court of appeals, the justices’
focus is on the latter, which statistics tell us was likely reviewed in order
to be overturned. Other circuits’ decisions implicated in the justices’
ruling were not their prime concern but in a way are bystanders.105 With
more than one case on each “side” of most intercircuit conflicts on which
the justices rule, no one court’s position stands out, except perhaps that
of the court whose case was reviewed for having created a conflict or
having made it more visible. This would serve to submerge any one
court’s association with a doctrinal position the justices considered, at
least relative to the identification that would occur when the case has
been taken directly from that court. It would thus limit the possible
“taint” that might arise from association with the position of another

105
Because judges of the courts of appeals watch each others’ decisions and are
aware of whether they are creating, or joining, intercircuit conflicts, there is a dynamic
interaction between the vertical dimension of the Supreme Court - court of appeals
relationship (the justices accepting cases to review intercircuit conflicts) and the
horizontal dimension (appeals court judges observing, and responding to, each others’
actions). See Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63
MONT. L. REV. 119 (2002). An example of the Supreme Court’s referring to a lower
court’s acknowledgment of a circuit conflict is United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681
(1987), where Justice Powell pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit, whose case had been
accepted for review, “acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ‘in a
case strikingly similar to this one, has reached the opposite conclusion.’ . . . It concluded,
however, that” the Ninth Circuit case “was wrongly decided.” Id. at 685 (citations
omitted).
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court, such as the Ninth Circuit, if, as some have alleged, some justices
have an animus toward that court.
It has been suggested that in evaluating certiorari petitions, the
justices, or their clerks serving in the cert pool, do take into account the
court from which the case comes and/or the judge who wrote the opinion
there,106 but there is no evidence to suggest that the clerks or the justices
look beyond the fact of an intercircuit conflict, as a cue for taking a case,
to the courts of appeals involved in the conflict when the decision is
made to grant review. Therefore we cannot be sure whether the Ninth
Circuit’s presence in a case, either as the source of the case or through its
presence in an intercircuit conflict, is in the front of the justices’ minds.
Thus we cannot ascertain whether its presence makes a difference or
what inference we should draw when the Supreme Court reverses the
Ninth Circuit at a high rate in cases taken directly from that court, and, of
particular relevance, we remain unsure of what to make of the justices’
treating the Ninth Circuit so well in intercircuit conflict cases taken from
other circuits. Only if we knew that those at the Supreme Court involved
in the process of deciding whether to grant review did take into account
the “other” courts involved in an intercircuit conflict could we begin to
say that upholding a court of appeals’ position in an intercircuit conflict
case taken from another court was really a direct comment on the former
court’s position.
VII. A LAST NOTE: WHAT COMES NEXT?
It has been clear at several points in this Article that the research
begun here could be carried forward and how that might be done. For
one thing, instead of relying on the cases the Supreme Court cites as
constituting the intercircuit conflict with which the Court is dealing,
which the justices often identify only as exemplars (with an “e.g.,”), one
could look more deeply in certiorari petitions and briefs to find other
cases which were implicated in the particular circuit split the justices
attempt to resolve. The study could also be extended by examining
separately the cases the Supreme Court has taken directly from the Ninth
Circuit which involved an intercircuit conflict. Here it would be
important to determine whether the Ninth Circuit was one of two or more

106
See PERRY, supra note 6. Another observer notes the absence of evidence that the
clerks in the “cert pool” go much beyond the cert. papers in examining cases to develop
their memos to the justices, so that if the cert. petition or any opposition or amicus brief
flagged other circuits’ decisions, the pool memo might note them but would not likely do
so otherwise. Private communication to author.

2005]

NINTH CIRCUIT IN THE SUPREME COURT

145

circuits on one side of a circuit split or whether it “stood alone”107 and
perhaps had created the intercircuit split that led the justices to grant
certiorari to resolve the conflict. It would also be important to look at
situations in which multiple circuits were on each side of an intercircuit
conflict, and to see whether the circuit in which the observer is interested
– be it the Ninth Circuit or some other court of appeals – had taken the
“majority position” or was in a minority stance relative to its sister
circuits.108
This Article is a study of one circuit, although one to which
particular attention has been paid because of the rate at which cases taken
directly from it have been overturned. It is hoped that this Article will
prompt others to examine what has happened with respect to other
circuits – to determine how the law of those circuits has fared in
intercircuit conflict cases taken from other circuits by comparison with
cases which go directly from the circuit of interest to the Supreme Court.
The topic is certainly an important one, and one to which therefore more
attention should be given in order to extend the work begun in these
pages.

107
For example, in O.T. 2000, in PGA Tours v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), the
Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, the latter in a decision the day after the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling, were in conflict. However, there were cases in which the Ninth Circuit
was in conflict with three or four other circuits, e.g., Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
There was, however, another O.T. 2000 case in which the Ninth Circuit was on one side,
and nine other circuits were on the other. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001).
108
For an instance in which the Ninth Circuit was among circuits adopting the
“majority” position, which the Supreme Court upheld, see Clay v. United States, 537
U.S. 522 (2003), in which six circuits were in conflict with two others. The Ninth
Circuit’s position could also be upheld when it was in the “minority” position, as in
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002), where there were four circuits against three,
including the Ninth Circuit.
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